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SYMPOSIUM
A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER?
Editors' Foreword
On March 24th and 25th, 2006, Fordham University School of Law held
the fourth in a series of conferences in constitutional and legal theory, 1
entitled A New Constitutional Order? In his introductory remarks, James E.
Fleming, the Leonard F. Manning Distinguished Professor of Law at
Fordham, and the organizer of this conference, eloquently framed the
conference's overarching themes: "As we celebrate the Centennial of
Fordham University School of Law and contemplate the post-September 11
world order and the dawn of the Roberts Court, it is fitting to ask whether
we have entered a new constitutional order. If so, what are its contours,
distinctive features, and commitments? If not, are we on the verge of doing
so?" A number of outstanding scholars gathered to weigh in on these
questions. Bruce Ackerman gave the keynote address, Terrorism and the
Emergency Constitution. The remainder of the conference was organized
into seven panels, whose presentations and deliberations were guided by the
following themes:
Panel 1: The Rehnquist Court and Beyond: Revolution, Counter-
Revolution, or Mere Chastening of Constitutional Aspirations? It
is commonplace to speak of a "Warren Court revolution." And
some have spoken of the Burger Court as "the counter-revolution
that wasn't." Did the Rehnquist Court pull off a revolution or
counter-revolution? Or do its significant decisions represent
merely a "chastening of constitutional aspirations," as Mark
Tushnet has argued? How would we know whether we are in the
midst of or have undergone a constitutional revolution or counter-
revolution? Do revolutionary transformations occur in convulsive
moments or through gradual change, for example, through a
process of partisan entrenchment? More generally, how should we
account for radical reinterpretation of the Constitution by judges?
This panel assesses competing theories of what constitutes a
constitutional revolution and considers where matters stand at the
dawn of the Roberts Court.
1. See Symposium, Fidelity in Constitutional Theory, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1247, 1247-
818 (1997); Symposium, The Constitution and the Good Society, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1569,
1569-2200 (2001); and Symposium, Rawls and the Law, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 1381, 1381-
2175 (2004).
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Panel 2: The Emergency Constitution in the Post-September 11
World Order. It is sometimes said that the events of September 11
"changed everything." What is the proper role of the Constitution
during national emergencies, including responses to terrorist
attacks? Should the Constitution be relaxed or suspended during
such emergencies? Or should the Constitution's general standards
still apply, even as we acknowledge that certain measures that
might be unconstitutional during peacetime may be permissible
during emergencies? More generally, what is the most defensible
conception of emergency powers in an age of terrorism? Should
we, as Bruce Ackerman has argued in Before the Next Attack,
construct a framework for an emergency constitution that allows
for short-term measures in states of emergency, including
responses to terrorist attacks, but which firmly draws the line
against permanent restrictions on basic freedoms? Are our
constitutional principles compatible with America as an imperial
power?
Panel 3: Constitutions in Exile: Is the Constitution a Charter of
Negative Liberties or a Charter of Positive Benefits? Many
conservatives have argued that the real Constitution has been in
exile since the New Deal and that it is time to restore it. For
example, Randy Barnett has called for "restoring the lost
Constitution," a charter of negative liberties that adopts a
presumption of liberty and against governmental regulation. At the
same time, Sotirios A. Barber has defended a largely forgotten
understanding of the Constitution (advanced by James Madison
and Abraham Lincoln) as a charter of positive benefits under which
government has affirmative duties to pursue the well-being of all
the people. What are the merits of and prospects for these
competing accounts of "Constitutions in exile"?
Panel 4: Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of
the New Constitutionalism. Over the last two decades, Ran Hirschl
argues in Towards Juristocracy, the world has witnessed an
"astonishingly rapid transition tojuristocracy," or the transfer of an
unprecedented amount of power from representative institutions to
judiciaries, whether domestic or supranational. This global trend is
strikingly evident in constitutionalization and the increasing
adoption of judicial review, even in countries that historically have
resisted them. Many proponents of judicial review associate it with
liberal and/or egalitarian values and portray it as promising
progressive social or political change. Others, including Hirschl,
emphasize the political construction of judicial power and are more
skeptical about the potential of constitutionalization of rights and
empowerment of judges for advancing progressive change. What
are the origins and consequences of this new constitutionalism?
Panel 5: Subnational Norms in the New Constitutional Order:
Federalism. For decades, conservatives have advocated "new
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federalism(s)" and celebrated states and localities as sources of
subnational norms. Liberals and progressives have distrusted
federalism as protecting founts of norms contrary to national and
universal norms. In recent years, conservatives have seen the
virtues of national power to pursue their visions, just as liberals and
progressives have seen the virtues of federalism to protect theirs.
What are we to make of these developments, as manifested, for
example, in the battle between proponents of the federal marriage
amendment and defenders of state court decisions and state laws
recognizing same-sex marriage and civil unions? Are
commitments to federalism merely instrumental to political ends?
Or does federalism have appeal in principle as part of a larger
scheme of multiple repositories of power resisting national power?
Panel 6: Subnational Norms in the New Constitutional Order:
Civil Society and Families. Many have called for reviving civil
society and shoring up families not only to inculcate civic virtue
but also to stand as buffers between the individual and the
government, whether national or state. Though this discourse has
long been dominated by conservatives, in recent years liberals,
progressives, and feminists have examined the place of families
and civil society in a formative project of fostering persons'
capacities for democratic and personal self-government as well as
in generating subnational enclaves of resistance to standardizing
norms. What is the appropriate division of responsibility among
families, other institutions of civil society, and government in the
project of forming persons into capable, responsible, self-
governing citizens? How do constitutional rights such as privacy
or autonomy, equality, freedom of association, and freedom of
religion facilitate yet also constrain such a formative project?
Panel 7: The International Migration of Constitutional Norms in
the New World Order. In recent years, we have seen the migration
of constitutional norms across national boundaries, both in framing
constitutions and in interpreting them. For example, American
constitutional lawyers have "exported" American constitutional
norms through projects of constitution making in other countries.
At the same time, some American courts have "imported"
constitutional norms by citing decisions of foreign courts, referring
to the laws of other countries, or invoking international human
rights norms. Migration has occurred not only across national
jurisdictions but also through the evolution of transnational
governance, as in the constitutionalization of the European Union.
What do such developments portend? What should be the
character of the international migration of constitutional norms in
the new world order?
The Fordham Law Review is honored to publish the papers presented
and, in many cases, augmented and revised in light of the colloquy that
2006]
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followed each panel, as well as the keynote address delivered by Bruce
Ackerman.
We would like to thank Dean William Michael Treanor for his ongoing
support of the Law Review and this series of conferences; the Fordham Law
School Office of Academic Programs, in particular Helen Herman and
Darin Neely, for their help in the planning and administering of this
conference; and the Fordham Law School Library Administration and Staff,
in particular Lawrence Abraham, for assistance in the publication of the
conference. A number of Fordham professors moderated panels and/or
contributed papers: Martin S. Flaherty, James E. Fleming, Abner S.
Greene, Tracy E. Higgins, Thomas H. Lee, Catherine Powell, and Dorothy
E. Roberts (while she was the Bacon-Kilkenny Distinguished Visiting
Professor at Fordham). Our deepest gratitude is to Professor James E.
Fleming, who conceived of the conference and served as its organizer.
